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Abstract 
Many developing countries are unable to provide their industrial sector with reliable electric 
power and many enterprises have to contend with insufficient and unreliable electricity 
supply. Because of these constraints, enterprises often opt for self-generation even though it 
is widely considered a second best solution.  This paper develops a theoretical model of 
investment behavior in remedial infrastructure when physical constraints are present. It then 
tests econometrically implications from this model using a large sample of enterprises from 
87 countries from the World Bank enterprise survey database. After showing that these 
constraints have non-linear effects according to the natural degree of reliance on electricity 
of an industrial sector and on firm size, the paper draws differentiated policy 
recommendations. Credit constraints appear to be the priority in sectors very reliant on 
electricity to spur entry and convergence to the technological frontier while, in other sectors, 
firms would benefit more widely from marginal improvements in electrical supply. 
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   And God said, 'Let there be light' and there was light, but the Electricity 
Board said He would have to wait until Thursday to be connected.  
Spike Milligan 
 
1. Introduction 
There is growing evidence, both micro- and macroeconomic, that better electricity 
infrastructure significantly boosts economic growth and improves a range of development 
outcomes.4 Energy is necessary for the operation of productive capital in the industrial sector. 
Low levels of infrastructure development and poor quality of services can drive up firms’ 
direct and indirect costs and bias their technological choices away from energy intensive 
ones, which in turn increases the overall costs relative to competitors in other regions.5 
Enterprises typically face more barriers in developing countries, where firms have difficulties 
getting connected to the public grid.6 When firms do get connections, the sanctioned load is 
often lower than their demand and they face frequent scheduled and unscheduled power cuts. 
In addition, fluctuations in voltage and frequency of power supplied causes machine damage, 
material losses, and variations in product quality. As a result, production volumes, 
manufacturing costs and output quality are all adversely affected; firms invest less or in less 
efficient technologies and have lower productivity growth. 
To offset these negative impacts, industrial firms in developing countries are often opting 
for self-generation even though it is widely considered a second best solution. Of the 25 Sub-
Saharan countries reviewed by Foster and Steinbucks (2009), in-house generation accounts 
for more than 25% of the installed generating capacity in 3 countries, and for more than 10% 
in 9 others. This of course has a negative impact on their overall investment capacity. In 
Nigeria, where 40% of electricity consumed is produced through auto-generation, firms 
spend up to 20–30% of initial investment on measures to enhance the reliability of electricity 
supply.7 It also drives up costs: in Africa, own-generated electricity is on average 313% more 
expensive than electricity from the grid according to the estimates of Foster and Steinbucks. 
                                                           
4
 See for example Calderón and Servén (2003), and Calderón (2009) for cross-country estimations, and 
Dinkelman (2009) and Lipscomb, Mobarak and Barham (2009) for microeconomic evidence. 
5
 Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran (2008). 
6
 World Bank (2005); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004). 
7
 Adenikinju (2005). 
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In environments with important credit constraints, such investments in mitigating 
technologies are often inaccessible to smaller firms or those more severely exposed to credit 
restrictions. Infrastructure failures and credit limitations therefore interact in constraining the 
development of enterprises, both by making existing investments less productive and by 
discouraging new ones. 
In this paper, we use a sample of 46,606 firms from 87 countries covering the period 
2002-2006 to analyze the behavior of firms facing infrastructure constraints. In particular, our 
objective is to understand under which conditions they decide to invest in their own 
generating capacity, how this decision is affected by the above-mentioned constraints and 
their interactions with firm- and sector-level characteristics, and ultimately what this implies 
in terms of firm-size distribution. Finding answers to these questions is important because it 
conditions industrial development policies and the prioritization by policy-makers of 
measures to improve the investment climate. 
A number of papers have documented the burden imposed on developing country firms 
by an erratic and low-quality electricity supply. Early contributions include Lee, Anas and Oh 
(1996) and Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray (1996)—both of which use data from Nigeria, 
Indonesia and Thailand.  Lee, Anas and Oh (1996) document the extent and incidence of 
public infrastructure deficiencies, the response of private entrepreneurs in terms of 
investment in private infrastructure and the private cost of generation. They conclude that the 
private costs of infrastructure deficiencies are substantial and that the burdens fall 
disproportionately on smaller firms, while pointing out large differences across these three 
countries, linked in particular to the regulatory environment.  In Indonesia and Thailand, the 
opening up of infrastructure markets to private providers and the possibility of shared 
production appears to ease constraints on all categories of firms and to improve the reliability 
of service flows.   
Hallward-Driemeier and Stewart (2004) document patterns of access to infrastructure 
services by enterprises in developing countries and show that access varies by type of service 
and firm size—with electricity often being the biggest problem, and larger firms expressing 
more concerns than smaller firms about all services. The authors report that an overwhelming 
majority of firms in poor countries is affected by electrical outages, leading to losses 
sometimes exceeding 10% of sales.  In Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, 
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improvements in the reliability of the power supply is found to increase garment 
manufacturers’ total factor productivity and the growth rates of their output and employment 
(Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae, 2005). Gulyani (1999) documents the impact of 
electricity hazards on an Indian car manufacturer and its upstream suppliers, which have 
devised an innovative generation and power-sharing system to solve their power problems. 
Gulyani argues that self-generation is economical and, combined with power sharing, can 
serve as a model that could be replicated to ameliorate the power problems plaguing large 
manufacturing firms in developing countries. 
Closest to our paper are contributions by Reinikka and Svensson (2002) and, more 
recently, by Steinbucks (2008) and Foster and Steinbucks (2009). Reinikka and Svensson 
analyze a sample of 171 Ugandan firms, some of which responded to poor electricity supply 
by investing in generators. They show that this came at the cost of reducing overall 
investment and installing less productive capital. Foster and Steinbucks (2009), after 
providing a very rich description of in-house electricity generation in 25 Sub-Saharan African 
countries, estimate that the weighted average cost of power own-generation for large firms is 
relatively small and that the main victims are the existing informal firms and the formal ones 
that were not created as a result of the prevailing constraints. They also allude to the potential 
benefit of allowing firms with generation capacity to resell power into the national grid. 
Steinbucks (2008) uses firm-level data from Sub-Saharan African countries and concludes 
that firms experiencing fewer credit constraints are more likely to own a private generator in 
the areas where public power supply is unreliable. 
Our original contribution is, first, to document systematically the effects of electricity 
deficiencies on the decision to invest in mitigating technology, i.e., in a generator, and to 
analyze how the impact varies across firm types and sector technological characteristics and, 
second, to show how these deficiencies affect the resulting patterns of industrial structure 
across countries and sectors. A theoretical model of firm responses to power outages allows 
us to derive precise predictions that are then tested with the data. Using a dataset with a wide 
coverage — 87 countries and 28 two-digit ISIC industrial classifications — we show that 
electricity-related constraints have non-linear effects that vary according to the degree of 
reliance on electricity of the sector and the size of the firm. We also show that, in sectors that 
are naturally more reliant on electricity, a large number of outages implies a skewed 
industrial structure with mostly large firms and fewer small ones. Finally, we discuss some 
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policy implications of our results. Addressing credit constraints to allow firms’ investments 
in generators appears to be the priority for sectors that are very reliant on electricity (as a way 
to spur entry and convergence toward the technological frontier) while, in other sectors, firms 
would benefit more widely from marginal improvements in electrical supply. We discuss 
how power-sharing versus pricing policies can be used to address these issues. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and provides descriptive 
statistics on the extent of electricity deficiencies and credit constraints, as they emerge from 
the enterprise surveys. Section 3 presents a model of investment by firms when infrastructure 
and credit constraints are present. Section 4 spells out the econometric specifications used to 
test the model’s predictions. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 discusses the policy 
implications and concludes. 
 
2. Data and Stylized Facts 
We use data from the enterprise surveys for 87 countries for which data on number of 
power outages is available, covering a total of 46,606 firms over the period 2002-2006.8  Of 
these, 77 countries also have data on generator and 34 countries have data on cost of 
electricity.9 
Many developing countries are unable to provide their industrial sector with reliable 
electric power and industrial enterprises have to contend with electricity that is insufficient 
and of poor quality.  
Table 1 shows the severity of electricity hazards across regions and country income 
groups. Column 1 reports a subjective indicator: the percentage of firms’ managers quoting 
electricity as major or severe constraint to their operations and growth. Electricity is 
perceived as a “major” or “very severe” constraint for 15% of the entrepreneurs overall and 
for more than 26% of firms located in low-income countries. The highest percentage of firms 
considering electricity as a serious problem is in South Asia (43% of firms) followed by East 
Asia, and Africa. 
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 See https://www.enterprisesurveys.org.  The list of countries surveyed can be found in Appendix Table A1. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to use survey data after 2006 for such an exercise since key questions about 
power were dropped from the questionnaire. 
9
 This yields a sample of 62 countries with data on generator and number of power outages, and 32 countries 
with data on generator, number of power outages and cost of electricity. 
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In columns 2 and 3 are objective indicators: the average number of power outages 
suffered by firms in a given country group, and the share of firms having suffered more than 
30 outages in the year before the survey. Overall, firms face cutoffs from the public 
electricity grid on average 28 times per year, but this number can be as high as 132 in South 
Asia and 61 in Africa. In these two regions, close to half of all the firms surveyed 
experienced more than 30 outages a year.  
 
Table 1:  Access to electricity by firms across regions and country income groups 
Region Percent of firms 
mentioning 
electricity as 
major or severe 
constraint 
Average  
number of  
power 
outages 
Percent of firms having 
more than 30 power 
outages 
Generator 
Ownership 
(Percent of 
firms) 
Europe/Central Asia 8.5% 9.72 5.7% 27.5% 
Latin America 9.3% 12.44 7.7% 21.2% 
East Asia & Pacific 25.1% 36,49 18.3% 28.7% 
Mid. East/North Africa 21.5% 41.32 22.1% 32.4% 
Sub Saharan Africa 16.4% 61.12 45.2% 36.6% 
South Asia 43.0% 131.74 49.0% 61.7% 
Country Income Level 
 
High 4.9% 1.32 0.2% - 
upper-middle 8.3% 13.02 6.2% 28.0% 
lower-middle 14.3% 13.76 9.1% 24.1% 
Low 26.4% 64.08 34.1% 42.4% 
Average 15.6% 27.57 15.2% 31.1% 
 
The picture provided by these three indicators is consistent across regions and income 
groups: constraints are more stringent in poorer countries and in South Asian, African, 
Middle-Eastern/North African, and East Asian countries—in that order. As a result, many 
firms invest in a back-up power generator: 31% of all firms own one. This number peaks at 
62% and 37% in South Asia and Africa, respectively. 
Appendix Table A3 presents general firm-level summary statistics. Table 2 shows a 
breakdown of these numbers according to generator ownership. Firms with installed 
generator capacity are typically larger and report more days without power from the public 
grid during the survey year. Moreover, such firms are slightly older. Conversely, firms not 
owning a generator are smaller, and are found mostly in environments with fewer outages.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics by ownership of generator 
  Owns a generator   Does not own generator 
  Mean Median   Mean Median 
Number of workers  258.40 55  118.97 21 
Age of firm 20.56 15  17.17 12 
Number of power outages per year 68.84 12  25.89 5 
Percent of Electricity coming from generator 21.35% 10.00%   - - 
Number of firms 13,553  30,093 
 
 
Looking now at firm characteristics, Table 3 shows that large firms (in terms of number 
of employees but with similar conclusions if sales, investment, or capital are considered) as 
well as foreign-owned, exporting and capital-city based firms report more frequently owning 
a generator. 
 
Table 3: Generator ownership and frequency of outages by firm characteristics 
    % of firms owning a Number of power outage 
     generator With a Generator Without a Generator Whole Sample 
By firm size Nber of firms 37,623 11,164 26,459 37,623 
 Small 30.2% 55.7 24.7 30.2 
 Medium 31.6% 55.8 20.0 31.6 
 Large 43.6% 67.4 17.7 43.6 
       
By firm ownership Nber of firms 42,742 13,388 29,354 42,742 
 Domestic 30.2% 73.3 27.4 43.1 
 Foreign 39.8% 44.0 17.1 29.0 
       
By firm exporting status Nber of firms 42,409 13,115 29,294 42,409 
 Exporter 44.1% 62.9 19.4 40.2 
 Non-Export 27.1% 69.8 27.9 40.7 
       
By firm location Nber of firms 31,436 10,516 20,920 31,436 
 Capital City 35.3% 91.5 35.1 55.9 
  No Capital City 32.6% 71.9 25.0 40.8 
 * Small firms have strictly less than 20 employees, medium firms employ between 20 and 99 workers and large firms have more than 100 
employees. 
The next section develops a theoretical model of firm-level investment in remedial 
infrastructure in the presence of electricity and credit constraints. 
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3. The Model 
We consider a continuous moral hazard investment model à la Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997). Entrepreneurs are endowed with assets A, which can be, for example, cash or 
productive assets they can pledge as collateral. To undertake a productive project of variable 
size I, they intend to borrow an amount I − A. 
The net return to the project depends on a complementary input, in this case electricity 
from the grid, the provision of which is of varying quality.  We assume that this net return is 
given by δr, where r is the gross return absent any infrastructure constraint, and δ ∈ [0, 1] 
captures the impact of electricity supply. In practice, the quality of supply as measured by the 
number of outages affecting the firm interacts with the sector-level “sensitivity to electricity” 
to determine the actual value of δ. In particular, when operating at the technological frontier, 
some sectors are naturally more reliant on electricity than others. We assume that for sectors 
with a higher sensitivity to electricity, a given number of outages has a stronger negative 
impact on the project return.10 Formally, in what follows, we will consider a simple version 
of this differential sensitivity corresponding to our empirical application below, in which 
there are two types of sectors with either high (indexed by H) or low (indexed by L) 
sensitivity, with δH(0) = δL(0) = 1, and 0 < δH(N) < δL(N) < 1 for all N > 0.  
The project yields δrI in case of success and 0 in case of failure, an outcome that is fully 
verifiable. However, the probability of success depends on the effort exerted by 
entrepreneurs, which is not observable by the lender. If the entrepreneur works, the 
probability of success is pH, while if he shirks, it is only pL < pH, but he enjoys a private 
benefit BI or equivalently saves on the cost of effort. 
The project is viable only if the project’s net present value (NPV) per unit of 
investment is positive. We assume that it is always negative if effort is not exerted (pLδr +B 
< 1 for all δ ∈ [0, 1]), but that it may be positive if effort is exerted. In other words, there is a 
threshold δ0 ≡ 1/pHr, such that pHδr > 1 for all δ > δ0. On the other hand, if δ < δ0, the unit 
NPV is too low and the project is not worth undertaking. Note that it follows from the 
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  As discussed in more details in the empirical section, this may be because the production process relies more 
on electricity and is therefore more affected by outages, or because deficiencies push firms to adopt less 
efficient technologies. 
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model’s assumption above that in sectors with a high sensitivity to electricity, the number of 
power outages N such that δ < δ0 is lower. 
The credit contract consists of an amount I and shares corresponding to the borrower (Rb) 
and the lender (Rl ), such that  δrI = Rb + Rl.  The incentive constraint of the borrower is 
given by: 
pHRb ≥ pLRb + BI   ⇔  Rb ≥ BI/∆p,     (1) 
which defines the maximum income pledgeable to the lender Rl = δrI – BI/∆p. Moreover, the 
lender must at least break even, which implies that: 
pHRl ≥ I − A.       (2) 
The problem is solved by assuming that the credit market is competitive, so profits are 
null and (2) is binding. After straightforward computations, we can characterize the level of 
investment: 
I ≤ kδA,        (3) 
where kδ = 1/[1+(pHB/∆p)−pHδr]. In a competitive credit market, borrowers get all the 
surplus, which can be written as Ubδ(A) = (pHδr−1)I = (pHδr−1) kδA, and they invest the 
maximum possible amount (I = kδA).11 
Alternatively, the firm can invest in a private substitute to ensure reliable electricity 
input, i.e., an electricity generator. This investment has a cost κ, leaving the firm with an 
initial capital A − κ, but the firm then ensures a return RG, such that RG < r.12 In that case, the 
firm proceeds to invest IG = kG(A − κ), where: 
kG = 1 / [1 + pHB/∆p − pHRG].    (4) 
The firm gets utility: 
UbG(A) = (pHRG – 1) kG(A − κ).     (5) 
 
 
                                                           
11
  The assumptions on the NPV imply that kδ > 1. We also need to assume that pHδr < 1 + pHB/∆p to ensure 
that the optimal size of the firm is not infinite. 
12
 The assumption RG < r captures the fact that the unit electricity cost from a generator is higher than that from 
the grid (see Foster and Steinbuks, 2009). It is a shortcut for a characterization with both a fixed and a variable 
cost of operating the generator.   
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Optimal Firm Decision 
Let us now compare the benefits from investing or not in a generator at different 
levels of wealth A. From the expressions of Ubδ(A) and UbG(A), we can draw Figures 1 and 2.  
Figure 1 represents the case in which δ > δ0, i.e., when the impact of electricity 
deficiencies is not too severe. In that case, two types of investment behavior coexist. Below 
the cutoff level A*, firms do not invest in generators but are still able to obtain credit and 
enter production, while above the threshold large firms invest in generators and obtain a 
higher leverage in the credit market.13 When power from the grid is reasonably reliable, entry 
to the productive sector is profitable across the range of potential entrepreneurs and sectors. 
A duality exists in terms of access to remedial investments and therefore productivity, and A* 
is increasing in δ, meaning that as long as δ > δ0, an increase in power cuts will trigger 
additional investments in generators. 
Figure 2 represents the case in which δ < δ0, i.e., when the impact is severely adverse.  In 
this parameter space, the outcome is stark: firms above a cutoff level AL invest in 
complementary capital, take credit and enter production, while firms below the cutoff are 
credit constrained, as infrastructure deficiencies are so stringent that the return from 
production is too low to access the credit market, and they lack the capacity to invest in a 
generator. Notably, in contrast to the previous case, AL does not depend on δ as long as δ < 
δ0. Although this is not explicitly modeled here, one can imagine that these potential 
entrepreneurs remain in the informal sector and consume their own endowments.  
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 Note that we represent the case where kG > kδ. If kδ exceeds kG, which is likely if electricity supply is 
completely flawless, firms borrow and produce at any level of wealth without the need to invest in a generator. 
Our data support the idea that this case is not relevant in our sample. 
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Following this discussion on the determinants of δ, one can think of the cases in Figures 1 
and 2 as capturing two types of variation in the environment. First, they may capture the 
difference between countries with reliable electric services and those with relatively worse 
services, i.e., a higher prevalence of outages. Second, they may relate to the sector-level 
fundamental characteristics discussed above, i.e., the sensitivity to electricity. 
From this basic model, we derive two related results.14 First, Proposition 1 states that the 
probability that firms own a generator increases in the number of outages N as long as the 
efficiency of electricity services is not too low (δ > δ0), while this probability does not 
depend on N when this efficiency is low (δ < δ0), as investment is discouraged altogether.  
Proposition 1       There is a threshold δ0 such that ∂A*/∂δ > 0 if and only if δ > δ0, while for 
δ < δ0, ∂A*/∂δ = 0.  
Intuitively, as long as the losses related to electricity deficiencies are not too high, it is 
optimal for firms at all levels of assets to operate, but only those above a given size find it 
profitable to invest in a generator. In this regime, a decrease in electricity efficiency pushes 
the marginal firms to invest in remedial equipment, so we expect to find a positive link 
between the probability to own a generator and the number of outages. On the other hand, 
when losses due to electricity deficiencies are very high, the returns for firms not owning a 
generator are so low that they disappear altogether. Then, the industry is populated only by 
firms that are large enough to invest in a generator, and the probability that they own a 
generator does not respond to the number of outages. 
As a result, in environment with electricity deficiencies, the model also has implications 
in terms of firm size distribution, as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  To put it in a nutshell: in 
sectors that are very sensitive to how efficient electricity supply is, there will be fewer small 
firms and, among existing (medium and large) firms, a larger proportion of firms owning a 
generator. 
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 Proofs are straightforward and are therefore omitted. An appendix with the formal derivation of the 
comparative statics results is available upon request. 
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Figure 3, which represents the profit of a firm of fixed size A < AL (i.e., a relatively small 
one) as the number of power outages N varies, illustrates the first part of this prediction. The 
downward slopping curves denoted Ub(δL(N)) and Ub(δH(N)) represent how the firm’s utility 
evolves with the number of outages in the low-sensitivity and high-sensitivity cases,  
respectively. The cutoffs NH and NL on the horizontal axis show the number of power outages 
above which small firms are pushed to exit. Outages are too much of a drain on profits to 
allow them to operate and they cannot afford a generator. Clearly, in the presence of 
electricity deficiencies, firms in more sensitive sectors are less likely to be profitable and 
therefore a smaller proportion of small firms are likely to exist. 
Figure 4 illustrates the second part of the prediction, concerning generator ownership by 
existing firms. It represents the profit of a firm of fixed size A > AL (i.e., a medium or large 
one) as the number of power outages N varies The cutoffs NH and NL are defined as before, 
and they now show the number of power outages above which the firm finds it profitable to 
invest in a generator. Again, the proportion of firms not owning a generator is smaller in 
sectors more sensitive to electricity. 
We summarize these insights in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2   Deficiencies in electricity supply have a different impact on the 
distribution of firms’ size depending on sectors’ characteristics. In sectors comparatively 
more sensitive to the efficiency of electric supply, a large number of outages results in small 
formal firms being relatively less abundant.  
 As explained above, this proposition states that, in the presence of outages, the 
likelihood that small firms invest and produce while not owning a generator is decreasing in 
the sector’s sensitivity to electricity.  As a result, a larger proportion of existing firms, 
medium and large, own a generator. 
The next section lays down the econometric specification to test these implications. 
4. Econometric Specifications 
The model specified above leads us to test the following empirical specifications 
regarding the decision to invest in an electric generator, which we can write as a binary 
decision problem: 
Genijc = 1[Gen*= θj + θc + θt + αlogNijc +  Xijc γ + εijc > 0],    (6) 
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where 1[.] is an indicator function equal to 1 if the statement in brackets is true, i indexes 
firms, Gen is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm owns a generator and 0 otherwise, the θ’s 
are sets of dummy variables for industries (j), countries (c), and years (t), Nijc is a measure of 
the number of power outages facing the firm, and Xijc is a vector of firm-level controls, also 
including measures of possible financial constraints facing the firm.  
The logarithmic term is meant to capture in a very generic fashion the non-linear effects 
of power outages outlined in the model, and we expect α > 0, meaning that the probability of 
owning a generator is increasing in the prevalence of outages. 
The model also implies that the coefficients should differ according to the intrinsic 
sensitivity of productive sectors to the quality of electric supply. An important question is 
how to define this latter aspect. We define Si as a measure of electricity expenditure as a 
percentage of total cost. To simplify further the empirical test, we define Sh as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for sectors relying importantly on electricity as an input, and 0 otherwise. 
To mitigate potential worries linked to the fact that technology choice is to some extent 
endogenous—so that industries in environments with many outages may substitute towards 
technologies that use less electricity—, the sector-level benchmark value is defined by 
reference to countries with relatively low electricity constraints.15 The underlying logic is to 
have a reference value of what technological choices would look like in a distortion-free 
environment, akin to a sectoral technological frontier. We do not need to assume that 
technological choices are the same in the presence of electricity deficiencies but, rather, that 
in sectors in which the first-best technology would be very electricity-intensive the impact of 
deficiencies will be felt stronger and will penalize firms more heavily, as those not owning 
generators will either suffer critical failures and damages, or they will have to settle for 
second-best technologies implying in both cases a larger efficiency gap. We discuss the 
technical details of the variable construction further in the next section. 
Equipped with this measure of “benchmark electricity intensity”, we can then test (6) on 
the two subsamples corresponding respectively to Sh = 0 and Sh =1. From the model, we 
expect a marginal increase in the number of outages to have a lesser impact in electricity-
intensive sectors, because firms have strong incentives to invest in generators as soon as 
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 This is standard practice in the empirical literature. Examples of industry-level reference values for innovation 
or barriers to entry can be found for example in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Fisman and Sarria-Allende 
(2004). 
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some deficiencies are felt, while in sectors that rely less on electricity a similar marginal 
increase should significantly increase the probability to own a generator (see Proposition 1).16 
The second set of predictions concerns the differential distribution of firm size across 
sectors. To address this, we start by presenting double differences across sectors (following 
the classification according to Sh defined above) and countries—distinguishing between 
countries with a high and small median (or average) number of outages. Formally, we 
estimate: 
Zjct =  θj + θc + θt + βNjct + δ (Njct*Sh*Ch) +  Xjct γ + εijc > 0],   (7) 
where Zjc is some industry/country level measure of the relative number of small firms. On 
the right hand side, Nijc is the number of power outages as above and the triple interaction 
term Njc*Sh*Ch captures the effect of outages in the group of electricity-intensive industries 
(Sh =1) in countries with a number of outages above the median/average (Ch =1). Finally, the 
full sets of industry, country and time dummies are included, as well as industry-country level 
controls, including all the related double-interaction terms. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
In order to estimate the specification above, we first need to construct the parameter Sh. 
The countries in our sample with the smallest number of power outages are Indonesia, 
Lithuania, Brazil, Poland and Thailand. Within this subsample, we compute the average cost 
of electricity as a percentage of total cost by industrial sector, as shown in Table 4. We 
classify as “very reliant on electricity” (Sh=1) industrial sectors that are above the median 
(7.7 percent) and the rest as sectors not relying too much on electricity (Sh=0). As all 
industrial sectors are not represented in our subsample of five countries with reliable 
electricity services, we assign a value for Sh in height missing industrial sectors following 
intuitive criteria.17 Table 5 presents summary statistics on these two subsamples of firms. 
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 In a previous version of this paper (Alby, Dethier and Straub, 2010), we approximated the non-linear shape 
with a quadratic specification of outages instead of the logarithmic one, and showed that the turning point was 
lower for electricity-intensive sectors.  
17
 A “core” set of sectors is systematically included in all enterprise surveys, so that the missing ones represent 
relatively few firms overall (see Dethier, Hirn and Straub, 2010, for a detailed description). We consider Sports 
Goods, Other manufacturing, and Mining and quarrying as industrial sectors that do not rely heavily on 
electricity (their cost share of electricity is less than 3.5 percent in the full sample of countries), and assign these 
sectors, as well as Accounting and Finance and Advertising and Marketing a value of Sh=0. Symmetrically, we 
assign a value Sh=1 for firms operating in IT services, Hotels and Restaurants, and Telecommunications 
(average cost share of electricity above 8.6 percent in the full sample for the first two).  
17 
 
Table 4:  Reliance on electricity in countries with reliable service, by industrial sector 
Industrial Sector Cost of Electricity (% of total cost) 
Number of firms having  
non zero electricity cost 
Other services 2.21 1 
Metals and machinery 3.50 352 
Leather 4.07 161 
Garments 4.44 759 
Auto and auto components 5.61 280 
Agroindustry 5.70 17 
Electronics 5.94 266 
Non-metallic/plastic materials 6.30 234 
Wood and furniture 6.93 495 
Construction 7.58 18 
Other unclassified 7.72 8 
Food 8.59 474 
Transport 11.08 11 
Chemicals and pharmaceutics 11.47 153 
Textiles 11.89 510 
Paper 12.40 28 
Retail and wholesale trade 13.31 2 
Other transport equipment 21.86 18 
Real estate and rental services 24.49 1 
Beverages 30.49 16 
Overall Total 7.07 3,804 
         Note: Lithuania, Thailand, Poland, Indonesia and Brazil are the countries in our sample  
                  with the least number of power outages. 
 
 
Table 5: Describing firms sub-samples according to Sh 
  
Sh   
 0 1 TOTAL 
Whole Sample      
Number of firms 20,064 20,651 40,715 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint 18.81% 15.88% 17.33% 
Average Number of power outage 22.71 23.18 22.95 
% of firms with a generator 28.59% 40.39% 33.33% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost) 6.29% 9.04% 7.43% 
By firms size    
Large(100 and over)      
Number of firms 5,173 4,212 9,385 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint 21.95% 21.90% 21.93% 
Average Number of power outage 29.96 27.35 28.79 
% of firms with a generator 46.69% 61.46% 52.65% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost) 4.99% 7.49% 5.99% 
Medium(20-99)      
Number of firms 6,942 6,276 13,218 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint 19.10% 19.47% 19.28% 
Average Number of power outage 21.65 25.33 23.40 
% of firms with a generator 27.30% 40.05% 32.62% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost) 6.33% 9.38% 7.62% 
Small(<20)      
Number of firms 7,949 10,163 18,112 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint 16.51% 11.13% 13.50% 
Average Number of power outage 18.92 20.13 19.60 
% of firms with a generator 15.31% 22.15% 17.92% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost) 7.91% 10.41% 8.94% 
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One standard worry with firm surveys is the potential non-response bias, since some 
firms may not respond to specific questions. Overall, non-response is more frequent among 
small and service firms, and this is also the case when looking in particular at missing data on 
generator ownership. This is a standard observation in firm surveys, the main reasons 
including lack of time and/or information by the person responding to interviewers, which is 
more likely to occur when dealing with small firms. Because of the way generator ownership 
is distributed among firm size categories, this may affect our estimates, even if these non-
responses are not driven by strategic considerations at firm level. While we have no 
systematic way to address this problem, results [not shown here to save space] indicate that 
most of our conclusions corresponding to specification (6) are robust to excluding small firms 
and all service activities respectively.18 
The results from estimating equation (6) by maximum likelihood using a probit model on 
the full sample are shown in Table 6.19 All specifications include country, industry and year 
dummies, and standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. We first introduce 
the number of power outages alone in columns 1 to 3. Column 1 reports the results with fixed 
effects only, and column 2 those with firm-level controls (age of firm, location, whether it 
exports or not, whether it has foreign capital or not, and firm size). To the extent that more 
power outages are likely to lead to more generator ownership, we expect the coefficient for 
the number of outages to be positive, and this is indeed what we obtain. In column 2, a 10 
percent increase in the number of outages adds 0.3 percent to the probability that firms own a 
generator. Note that in column 2, the coefficients of the age, capital city, and particularly 
export and foreign ownership dummies are large, positive and significant, while their 
inclusion actually reinforces the effects of power outages and credit constraints. 
Column 3 introduces several measures of financial constraints: a dummy indicating 
whether access to financing is a major/severe constraint; a dummy indicating whether the 
cost of financing is major/severe constraint; and a dummy indicating whether the firm has 
access to an overdraft facility or line of credit. These variables again have the expected effect 
                                                           
18
 A more general issue is the fact that surveys cannot provide information on firms that were not born, because 
of credit constraints or unreliable public power supply.  Dethier, Hirn and Straub (2010) address this “camels 
and hippos” self-selection issue in details, stressing in particular that econometric models like the one in this 
paper only provide information about the effect of constraints on the sample of existing firms, and that the 
analysis of entry would require different models. However, since self-selection is hardly ever likely to be 
complete, some informative variation should remain in the data. 
19
 See Appendix Table A2 for a description of the variables. 
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on the probability to own a generator, i.e., more stringent constraints decrease it, and more 
importantly their inclusion does not invalidate the results on outages.  
Both firm-level controls and financial constraints proxies should be seen as control 
variables for the sake of robustness and their respective coefficients should not be interpreted 
as uncovering causal links, as specific endogeneity concerns arise from omitted variable bias 
and unobserved effects such as entrepreneurial skills. 
In column 4 we add the electricity-intensive sector dummy, and in columns 5 to 7 we 
introduce its interaction term with outages, which turns out to be negative as expected. This 
means that the marginal impact of outages is lower in electricity-intensive sectors. Note that 
in columns 4 and 7, the coefficient for Sh is large, positive and significant. Indeed, as stressed 
in the model, firms in these sectors are much more likely to own a generator at baseline, as 
even a small number of interruptions can have very disruptive effects. In such a context, a 
marginal increase in the number of outages only has a limited effect on generator ownership. 
Table 6: Remedial capital ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Full Sample 
Probit Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator 
Number of Power Outage (Log) 0.082 0.097 0.057 0.055 0.098 0.117 0.077 
  
(7.99)*** (8.61)*** (4.24)*** (3.98)*** (6.82)*** (7.46)*** (4.56)*** 
Sectors very reliant on electricity Sh       0.379 0.155 0.239 0.459 
 
      (1.76)* (0.58) (0.88) (2.01)** 
Number of Power Outage (Log) * Sh         -0.037 -0.046 -0.051 
  
        (1.53) (2.03)** (1.86)* 
Access to Financing Major/Severe Constraint     -0.12 -0.142     -0.142 
  
    (3.02)*** (3.96)***     (3.98)*** 
Cost of Financing is Major/Severe Constraint     -0.057 -0.055     -0.053 
  
    (1.74)* (1.6)     (1.53) 
Overdraft Facility or Line of Credit     0.209 0.198     0.198 
  
    (5.47)*** (5.09)***     (5.16)*** 
Age   0.005 0.003 0.004   0.006 0.004 
  
  (3.89)*** (2.40)** (3.96)***   (6.03)*** (3.90)*** 
Capital City dummy   0.11 0.144 0.146   0.109 0.144 
  
  (2.14)** (2.46)** (2.38)**   (2.05)** (2.33)** 
Export dummy   0.372 0.303 0.287   0.358 0.282 
  
  (7.90)*** (6.68)*** (6.33)***   (7.57)*** (6.29)*** 
Foreign dummy   0.218 0.206 0.208   0.227 0.214 
  
  (5.01)*** (4.38)*** (4.32)***   (5.25)*** (4.53)*** 
Constant -1.001 -1.068 -0.799 -1.016 -1.411 -1.325 -1.057 
  
(5.38)*** (4.63)*** (3.58)*** (6.50)*** (10.74)*** (8.34)*** (6.67)*** 
Firm Size dummies   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,943 18,786 12,704 12,240 24,451 18,320 12,240 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Next in Table 7, we estimate (3) on the two subsamples corresponding respectively to 
Sh=0 (columns 1 to 3) and Sh=1 (columns 4 to 6). This specification is less constraining, as it 
does not impose equality of the control variables’ coefficients across subsamples. Table 7 
confirms that the marginal effect is smaller in electricity-intensive sectors. Comparing 
columns 3 and 6, which include the full set of control variables for the cases Sh=0 and Sh=1 
respectively, the coefficient of the log of outages in electricity-reliant industries is 36% 
smaller and only significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 7: Complementary capital decision depending on sectors’ reliance on electricity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Sh=0 Sh=0 Sh=0 Sh=1 Sh=1 Sh=1 
Probit Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator Generator 
Number of Power Outage (Log) 0.091 0.109 0.064 0.069 0.08 0.041 
  
(6.37)*** (6.90)*** (3.56)*** (4.99)*** (4.81)*** (1.92)* 
Access to Financing Major/Severe Constraint     -0.096     -0.197 
  
    (2.11)**     (3.67)*** 
Cost of Financing is Major/Severe Constraint     -0.116     0.022 
  
    (2.72)***     (0.41) 
Overdraft Facility or Line of Credit     0.21     0.177 
  
    (4.64)***     (2.59)*** 
Age   0.005 0.004   0.006 0.004 
  
  (3.97)*** (2.72)***   (4.44)*** (2.76)*** 
Capital City dummy   0.146 0.168   0.065 0.123 
  
  (2.13)** (2.13)**   (0.8) (1.27) 
Export dummy   0.438 0.319   0.23 0.208 
  
  (6.83)*** (5.79)***   (3.30)*** (2.92)*** 
Foreign dummy   0.185 0.184   0.276 0.239 
  
  (3.56)*** (3.13)***   (3.81)*** (2.97)*** 
Constant -1.506 -1.57 -1.319 -0.834 -0.522 0.082 
  
(13.33)*** (9.53)*** (7.78)*** (3.07)*** (1.44) (0.28) 
Firm Size dummies   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,907 10,511 7,595 10,544 7,806 4,645 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
The marginal effects mentioned above, however, are average marginal effects of the 
variables of interest computed at the sample mean of explanatory variables (28 for outages). 
The model’s prediction can be more accurately confirmed by comparing the evolution of the 
marginal impact across the range of values of outages, which in our sample goes from zero to 
several hundred each year. Figure 5 shows the marginal effect computed at different level of 
outages, ranging from 1 to 600. Clearly, the marginal impact increases for sector not very 
reliant on electricity while, in electricity intensive sectors (Sh=1), it is almost flat across the 
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entire range. In this group, a 10% increase in outages implies approximately a 1.5% increase 
in the probability to own a generator, while in the Sh=0 group, the added probability varies 
between 1.6% at low level of outages and close to 2% at high levels.  
 
Figure 5: Marginal effect of outages at different level of efficiency 
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Next we turn to the analysis of firm size distribution. Following the model, we 
hypothesize that the higher the number of power outage the fewer small firms will manage to 
operate, especially in sectors relying strongly on electricity. We first present some simple 
difference-in-differences to highlight this phenomenon.  
Table 8 shows the percentage of firms by size categories in different groups of countries 
(respectively those above or below the median number of outages in the full sample, equal to 
7.9)20 and sectors, for the two first categories of firms (strictly less than 10 employees, and 
between 10 and 19 employees), while Figure 6 shows corresponding values for all size 
categories.21  
Concentrating for example on firms in the second category (less than 10 employees), we 
find that, as expected, there are relatively less small firms in countries where the average 
observed number of outage is above the median  (31.42 and 22.01% respectively) than in 
                                                           
20
  The median across country-level averages is 7.9 and we split the sample in two equally-sized groups of 
countries. 
21
  Using instead as threshold the average number of outages (11.56) yields very similar results.  We have 
omitted tables and figures for this case in order to save space. 
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countries where the average number of outages is below this median (36.17 and 22.92% 
respectively). However, specific sector characteristics imply that the number of small firms is 
always higher in sectors very reliant on electricity than in others (36.17 and 31.42% vs. 22.92 
and 22.01% respectively). Taking the double difference across countries and sectors therefore 
allows us to control for sectors’ unobserved characteristics. 
 
Table 8: Firm size distribution as a function of efficiency of the grid 
  
Countries With 
Number  
of Outages  
< 7.90 (Median) 
Countries With 
Number  
of Outages  
> 7.90 (Median) 
Above vs. 
Below median 
diff. 
Percent of firms employing strictly 
less than 5 employees      
Sh=1 26.37% 18.02% -8.35% 
Sh=0 16.01% 9.34% -6.67% 
Sh=1 vs. Sh=0 diff. 10.36% 8.68% -1.68% 
Percent of firms employing strictly 
less than 10 employees     
Sh=1 36,17% 31,42% -4,75% 
Sh=0 22,92% 22,01% -0,90% 
Sh=1 vs. Sh=0 diff. 13,25% 9,41% -3,84% 
Percent of firms employing 
between 10 and 19 employees     
Sh=1 15,49% 19,54% 4,05% 
Sh=0 14,81% 21,86% 7,05% 
Sh=1 vs. Sh=0 diff. 0,68% -2,32% -3,00% 
 
To put these numbers in perspective, note that looking only at electricity-intensive 
sectors (Sh=1), comparing the group of countries with a number of outages below the median 
to that of countries with above-median number of outages shows that the absolute number of 
firms decreases by 2,087 (a 16% decrease). Of these firms’ disappearances, 71% (i.e., 1,474 
firms) correspond to establishments of less than 5 employees. A similar comparison for non-
electricity-intensive sectors (Sh=0) shows that the total number of firms is stable between the 
two groups of countries (only 18 less firms in high-outage countries) and that the reduction in 
the number of small firms is smaller than in electricity-intensive sectors, as shown by the 
double differences highlighted in bold in Table 8. 
Table 8 thus shows that the number of small firms, as a percentage of the total number of 
firms, is smaller in electricity-intensive sectors in countries with a higher than median 
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number of outages. Figure 6 confirms that the effect concentrates on the lowest size 
categories, while the relative proportions increase for all other categories. 
 
Figure 6: Change in firm size distribution as a function of grid efficiency  
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Table 9: Firm size distribution as a function of power outages 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Number of Small Firms (<5)  
per Industry and Country  
/ Total Number of Firms  
per Industry and Country 
Number of Small Firms (<10)  
per Industry and Country  
/ Total Number of Firms  
per Industry and Country  
Gini index (computed on  
firms' number of employees)  
per Industry and Country 
  Tobit Tobit OLS 
Average Number of Power Outage (/100)  
per Industry and Country 
 
-0.499 
 
-0.253 
 
0.178 
  (1.96)* (1.37) (1.96)* 
Average Number of Power Outage (/100)  
per Industry and Country 
 
-0.642 
 
-0.606 
 
0.122 
* Sh (dummy) * High Number of  
Power Outage Country (dummy) 
(2.02)** (1.69)* (0.62) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,777 1,777 1,777 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the country level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
To confirm these results, in Table 9 we present estimations of specification (7), including 
a full set of industry, country and time dummies. In columns 1 and 2, consistently with the 
previous evidence, our dependent variable Zjct is the number of small firms (less than 5 or 10 
employees) per industry and country divided by the total number of firms per industry and 
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country. Alternatively, in column 3 we use a different measure of size distribution, namely a 
Gini index computed on firms' number of employees per industry and country. 
In columns 1 and 2, we find as expected, that for a given industry and country a higher 
number of outages corresponds to a smaller proportion of small firms. Moreover, the triple 
interaction term (Average Number of Power Outage (/100) per Industry and Country * Sh * 
Ch (High Number of Power Outage Country dummy)) is negative and significant for both size 
categories (under 5 and 10 employees). 
In column 3, we get similar results using the Gini index, which is a measure of 
concentration of the whole distribution of firms, although the interaction term is not 
significant (signs are now reversed as a higher Gini index implies that there are less small 
firms). The slight loss of significance is not surprising though, as our Gini measure capture a 
change in the full distribution rather than exclusively focusing on the share of small firms. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The results of our empirical exercise can be summarized in an intuitive way as follows. 
For sectors that are very reliant on electricity, such as the chemical or textile industries, a 
high prevalence of outages affect the returns to investment so badly that small firms that lack 
enough initial assets to invest in an electric generator end up being squeezed out of the 
financial market and unable to borrow to expand production. In these sectors, the probability 
that firms invest in a generator only depends mostly on their level of initial assets; it is not (or 
less) affected by the prevalence of outages. In these sectors, we see a number of large firms 
with investments in complementary capital (power generator) and few small formal firms. 
The policy implication hence seems to be that the priority to improve performance in 
sectors that naturally rely heavily on electricity is to relax financial constraints before 
addressing physical ones, because firms active in these sectors will have to invest in own 
generating capacity in order to avoid costly production interruptions and their ability to do so 
depends primarily on their access to the credit market. On the other hand, at least as long as 
(close to) full reliability is not obtained, marginal improvements in the quality of electric 
supply will have little effect, as they will be insufficient to spur meaningful entry of small 
firms to the market, while leaving large firms unaffected. 
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It is in sectors for which the first-best technology is very reliant on electricity that 
deficient supply will induce the biggest distortions, as firms will face the choice of invest in 
costly generators or settle for second-best technologies implying large efficiency gaps. 
Targeting these sectors with policies easing the access to credit, for example through the 
provision of credit guarantees for firms investing in electric generators, might have large 
payoffs if it allows for sector-wide technological adjustments towards the efficiency frontier. 
By contrast, in sectors that are less reliant on electricity, the probability to invest in a 
generator is positively affected by the prevalence of power outages, and it is also affected by 
financial constraints, though less strongly than before. In addition to a number of large firms 
with investments in complementary capital, a larger range of small firms manage to access 
the credit market and produce formally, despite not having invested in a generator, and whose 
technology is closer to the frontier. For these firms, improvements in electric supply are 
likely to have significant positive payoffs. 
Both sets of implications could theoretically be addressed by a policy mix targeting the 
relaxing of credit constraints to large firms willing to invest in electricity generator (specific 
public loans or guarantees for example) while allowing for the resale of this electricity to 
small firms around them.22 However reselling electricity to the grid is not the general practice 
for enterprises in developing countries.  It requires a legislative and/or regulatory enabling 
framework and, more importantly, economic incentives for utilities and private firms, which 
is not automatically the case.23  While co-generation (for example, from bagasse by sugar 
producers) is easier to accommodate because it has a zero marginal cost, this usually involves 
considerable negotiations because of seasonality and uncertainty in terms of volume. Another 
consideration highlighting the difficulty to succeed with such arrangements relates to the 
reason for which firms purchase their generators in the first place. They are either large 
enterprises wanting to be independent from the grid for economic or security reasons (e.g., 
refineries or mining companies)—and therefore having little incentive to sell small volumes 
to the grid—or small and medium enterprises which need stand-by generators in case of 
outages or to ensure high reliability of power supply.  
                                                           
22
 See the discussion in Lee, Anas and Oh 1996 and in Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray 1996. 
23
  Most firms' generators run on diesel and their marginal cost is much higher than that of large public utilities 
using fossil fuel-fired power plants, even when there are large line losses.  
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If reselling electricity to the grid is not feasible, a policy of charging different electricity 
prices for large and small firms is a possibility. As mentioned earlier, there are important 
scale economies in own-power generation so that smaller firms would be willing to pay much 
more for public power than larger firms. Instead of giving quantity discounts, public 
monopolies should charge larger firms more and smaller firms less than they presently do.  
As pointed out by Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray (1996), in countries where large firms have 
excess capacity like Nigeria, they could make intensive use of their idle power generating 
capacity while, in countries where firms are expanding like Indonesia, they would enlarge 
their facilities. In both types of countries, small users would realize savings by having to rely 
less on expensive power generators. The evidence uncovered in this paper adds to the 
potential rationale for such an approach. 
27 
 
Appendix. 
 
 
Table A1: List of surveyed countries  
Country Year of survey 
Number of 
firms 
 
Country Year of survey 
Number of 
firms 
Albania 2002 / 2005 364 Lebanon 2006 331 
Algeria 2002 552 Lesotho 2003 56 
Angola 2006 356 Lithuania 2002 / 2004 / 2005 643 
Armenia 2005 522 Madagascar 2005 240 
Azerbaijan 2002 / 2005 520 Malawi 2005 144 
Bangladesh 2002 964 Malaysia 2002 759 
Belarus 2002 / 2005 542 Mali 2003 127 
Benin 2004 170 Mauritania 2006 212 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 / 2005 370 Mauritius 2005 199 
Botswana 2006 133 Moldova 2002 / 2003 / 2005 625 
Brazil 2003 1,634 Mongolia 2004 195 
Bulgaria 2002 / 2005 548 Montenegro 2003 32 
Burkina 2006 118 Morocco 2004 276 
Burundi 2006 234 Namibia 2006 85 
Cambodia 2003 360 Nicaragua 2003 449 
Cameroon 2006 108 Niger 2005 115 
Cape Verde 2006 43 Oman 2003 78 
Chile 2004 930 Pakistan 2002 964 
Costa Rica 2005 337 Peru 2002 347 
Croatia 2002 / 2005 413 Philippines 2003 668 
Czech Republic 2002 / 2005 609 Poland 2002 / 2003 / 2005 1,580 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2006 300 Portugal 2005 503 
Ecuador 2003 451 Romania 2002 / 2005 855 
Egypt 2004 938 Russia 2002 / 2005 1,096 
El Salvador 2003 457 Senegal 2003 210 
Eritrea 2002 74 Serbia 2003 408 
Estonia 2002 / 2005 388 Serbia & Montenegro 2002 / 2005 546 
Macedonia (FYROM) 2002 / 2005 342 Slovakia 2002 / 2005 380 
Georgia 2002 / 2005 374 Slovenia 2002 / 2005 411 
Germany 2005 1,196 South Africa 2003 384 
Greece 2005 538 South Korea 2005 598 
Guatemala 2003 455 Spain 2005 604 
Guyana 2004 148 Swaziland 2006 212 
Honduras 2003 443 Syria 2003 421 
Hungary 2002 / 2005 796 Tajikistan 2002 / 2003 / 2005 473 
India 2006 3,788 Tanzania 2003 211 
Indonesia 2003 713 Thailand 2004 1,163 
Ireland 2005 498 Turkey 2002 / 2004 / 2005 2,321 
Jamaica 2005 71 Uganda 2003 268 
Kazakhstan 2002 / 2005 835 Ukraine 2002 / 2005 973 
Kenya 2002 / 2003 247 Uzbekistan 2002 / 2003 / 2005 659 
Kyrgyzstan 2002 / 2003 / 2005 474 Vietnam 2005 1,610 
Laos 2006 236 Zambia 2002 206 
Latvia 2002 / 2005 380 Total Number of Firms   46,606 
 
 
28 
 
 Table A2: Description of the variables used in the analysis  
Variable Name Related Survey Question Codification 
Number of workers Average number of permanent workers. - 
Age of firm In what year did your firm begin operations in this country? 
Age of the firm is computed as the 
difference between the year the survey was 
made the year in which the firm began 
operations. 
Firm size - 
Small firms have strictly less than 20 
employees, medium firms have between 20 
and 99 employees, large firms have more 
than 100 employees. 
Industrial sector In which economic sector does your establishment mainly operate? A dummy is created for each of the 28 
sectors. 
Capital City Where are this establishment and your headquarters located in this country? 
If the answer is the capital city of the 
surveyed country then dummy = 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Firm exporting status What percent of your establishment’s sales are: 1) sold domestically; 2) 
exported directly; 3) exported indirectly (through a distributor). 
If more than 20 percent of sales are 
exported directly or indirectly then dummy 
= 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Firm ownership What percentage of your firm is owned by: 1) domestic private sector; 2) foreign privates sector; 3) government or state; 4) other? 
If more than 20 percent of the firm is 
owned by the foreign private sector then 
dummy = 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Number of power outage During how many days last year did your establishment experience power 
outages or surges from the public grid? - 
Generator ownership Does your establishment own or share a generator? Yes, Dummy=1 ; No, Dummy=0 
Electricity is a severe or major 
constraint 
Tell us if electricity (e.g. interest rates) is a problem for the operation and 
growth of your business. If this issue poses a problem, judge its severity as an 
obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = No obstacle; 1 = Minor obstacle; 2 = 
Moderate obstacle; 3 = Major obstacle; 4 = Very Severe Obstacle. 
If this obstacle is a major one (3) or a very 
severe one (4) then dummy = 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
100 percent of working capital 
financed through internal funds 
Identify the contribution over the last year of each of the following sources of 
financing for your establishment’s working capital. 
If 100 percent of the contribution comes 
from internal funds or retained earnings 
then the dummy = 1 and 0 otherwise. 
100 percent of new investment 
financed through internal funds 
Identify the contribution over the last year of each of the following sources of 
financing for your establishment’s new investments. 
If 100 percent of the contribution comes 
from internal funds or retained earnings 
then the dummy = 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Access to financing is a severe or 
major constraint 
Tell us if access to financing (e.g. collateral) is a problem for the operation and 
growth of your business. If this issue poses a problem, judge its severity as an 
obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = No obstacle 1 = Minor obstacle 2 = 
Moderate obstacle 3 = Major obstacle 4 = Very Severe Obstacle. 
If this obstacle is a major one (3) or a very 
severe one (4) then dummy = 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Cost of financing is a severe or major 
constraint 
Tell us if cost of financing (e.g. interest rates) is a problem for the operation and 
growth of your business. If this issue poses a problem, judge its severity as an 
obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = No obstacle 1 = Minor obstacle 2 = 
Moderate obstacle 3 = Major obstacle 4 = Very Severe Obstacle. 
If this obstacle is a major one (3) or a very 
severe one (4) then dummy = 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Overdraft facility or line of credit Do you have an overdraft facility or line of credit? Yes, Dummy=1 ; No, Dummy=0 
Total Cost 
Sum of purchases of raw materials, cost of energy, cost of labor, interest costs, 
rental costs (machinery, equipment, land, buildings, vehicles), royalty or license 
fees) and other costs. 
- 
Cost of electricity Value of electricity consumption for a year. Expressed in Dollar of the year in which the 
survey was made. 
Cost of labor Manpower costs including wages, salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits. 
Expressed in Dollar of the year in which the 
survey was made. 
Cost of energy Consumption of energy including electricity, fuels and others. Expressed in Dollar of the year in which the 
survey was made. 
Cost of generator (% energy cost) Percentage of energy costs to run generator. - 
Interest costs Interest charges and financial fees. Expressed in Dollar of the year in which the 
survey was made. 
Other costs Overhead expenses, selling and general administration expenses or design dept. Expressed in Dollar of the year in which the 
survey was made. 
NB: All questions are related to the year preceding the survey 
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Table A3: Summary statistics for all firms  
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum S.D Observations 
Number of workers 132.63 22 0 31,664 484.63 45,860 
Age of firm 16.60 11 0 261 19.06 45,348 
Number of power outage per year 27.57 3 0 7,355 91.08 46,606 
Generator Ownership (% of firms with a generator) 34.92 0 0 100 47.67 25,043 
Cost of electricity (% total costs) 7.41 3 0 100 15.03 10,327 
% of firms’ working capital financed through internal funds 62.12 77 0 100 39.73 45,326 
% of firms fully financed through internal funds 40.31 0 0 100 49.05 45,326 
% of firms quoting access to finance as severe or major constraint 25.80 0 0 100 43.75 44,711 
% of firms quoting electricity as severe or major constraint 18.60 0 0 100 38.92 46,332 
 
 
Table A4 provides information on access by firms to the credit market. Interestingly, 
most “objective” measures of credit constraints indicate that small firms are suffering more 
than their larger counterparts, while perceived constraints are more stringent for medium 
firms. When disaggregating by generator ownership and perception of electricity constraints 
respectively, firms without generator and firms suffering from electricity constraints appear 
to be more concerned by access and cost of finance. 
 
Table A4: Credit constraints by firm characteristics 
  
% of firms quoting 
Access to finance as 
severe or major 
constraint 
% of firms quoting 
Cost of finance as 
severe or major 
constraint 
% of firms' working 
capital financed 
through internal 
funds 
% of firms' new 
investment financed 
through internal 
funds 
% of firms with 
100% of  working 
capital financed 
through internal 
funds 
% of firms with 
100% of  new 
investment financed 
through internal 
funds 
By firm size       
Small 19,3% 31,4% 68,4% 54,2% 47,4% 44,6% 
Medium 22,7% 36,3% 58,2% 50,8% 35,2% 38,1% 
Large 19,9% 31,2% 53,4% 49,8% 30,3% 35,2% 
By generator ownership       
With generator 23.3% 35.1% 53.5% 50.7% 30.0% 37.0% 
Without generator 26.2% 40.4% 56.1% 44.2% 35.4% 34.0% 
By perceived severity of electricity constraint 
Major or severe 40.1% 47.4% 59.1% 57.5% 37.5% 42.3% 
Mild 17.1% 28.5% 62.6% 52.1% 39.8% 40.3% 
TOTAL 20,7% 32,3% 60,7% 51,7% 38,7% 39,7% 
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